环境伦理学是一个简单的概念与人类。我能想到的时候,我将已经削弱了东西的强烈愿望。可以改变,贪吃的原因是否与食物和饮料,或者在生理上的愉悦程度,或者介于两者之间的任何东西。显然环境伦理学是凭直觉与人类经验有关。
将再次似乎没有弱点:我们的好理由表明,Leontius没有做错了现在心甘情愿地走了。仍然是有可能的,然而,Leontius不愿意而不是弱点的是否会有某种生物缺乏选择。
这就是斯特劳森的观点,人类不能道德责任发挥作用[8]的参数运行,没有什么可以原因本身,或授予的隋,只有事情自己可以选择自己的行为道德上的原因。作为人类并不授予的隋,因此他们无法对自己的行为承担道德责任。以其他的术语来说,人类是我们遗传禀赋的求和结果,和我们的环境教育,这两个的来源是我们所有的行动,我们不能举行道德责任作为人类别无选择的形成自己的遗传禀赋或环境教育。
澳洲环境学论文代写:环境伦理
Akrasia is a simple concept to relate to as a human. I can think of times where my will has been weakened by a strong desire for something. The something can vary, whether for gluttonous reasons related to food and drink, or for physical pleasure, or anything in between. Clearly akrasia is intuitively related to the human experience.
With no weakness of will it seems again that our nice excuse showing that Leontius did not do wrong willingly is now gone. It is still possible however, that Leontius was not willing if instead of a weakness of will there was some sort of biological lack of choice at play.
This is where Strawson's argument that humans cannot be morally responsible comes into play [8] The argument runs that nothing can be the cause of itself, or causa sui, and only things that are the cause of themself can choose their own actions morally. As human beings are not causa sui, they therefore cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. In other terms, as human beings are the sum result of our genetic endowment, and our environmental upbringing, both of which are the source of all of our actions, we cannot be held morally responsible as humans have no choice in the formation of either their own genetic endowment or environmental upbringing.
