笛卡尔在冥想的最后想象了一个“邪恶的魔鬼”，因为他用这个概念来说明大多数知识都是可疑的，一个人要想真正找到可验证的知识的可信基础，就必须从怀疑的立场开始。为此，笛卡尔指出，在意识到自己需要从头开始对知识的追求时，“如果我想建立任何坚定而持久的知识，我需要推倒一切，从基础重新开始”(笛卡尔157L)。因此，在设计一个可以误导人类进入错误认识位置的理论“恶魔”时，笛卡尔开始“拆毁一切，重新开始”，追求“坚定而持久的知识”。庄子在自己的学术中也提出了类似的质疑。首先，庄子提出了怀疑主义的观点，认为知识是根本不可能的，因为对他来说，主观性和客观性之间的鸿沟是无法逾越的。他之所以这么说，是因为他坚持认为“一切都只是主观的;没有客观性这回事。所以没有所谓的知识”(庄子322)。从这个意义上说，他认为知识是不可能的，因为人类只能拥有不完美的主观观点。澳洲留学生论文代写:邪恶的魔鬼构建了竞争的终极主体性,庄子让另一个持怀疑态度的观点的基础上,与普遍的变化是“普遍的可变性,”概念,由于每个人对事物不同,“没有办法决定哪些观念应该被信任,”(庄子322),又为我们提供了客观知识的含义是不可能的。
澳洲留学生论文代写:邪恶的魔鬼
Descartes imagines an “evil demon” at the end of Meditation because he uses this concept to illustrate that most knowledge is dubious and that one must start from a position of skepticism if they are to be able to truly find a trustworthy foundation for verifiable knowledge. To this end, Descartes remarks how, in realizing that he would need to start his pursuit of knowledge from scratch, “I would need to tear down everything and begin anew from the foundations if I wanted to establish any firm and lasting knowledge” (Descartes 157L). Thus, in devising a theoretical “evil demon” that can mislead humans into positions of false knowledge, Descartes is beginning to “tear down everything and begin anew” in his pursuit of “firm and lasting knowledge”.Zhuangzi makes similar arguments in pursuit of establishing skepticism in his own scholarship. For one, Zhuangzi makes the skeptical argument that knowledge is ultimately impossible because, for him, the divide between subjectivity and objectivity cannot be overcome. He argues such because he maintains that “Everything is merely subjective; there is no such thing as objectivity. So there is no such thing as knowledge” (Zhuangzi 322). In this sense, he views knowledge as impossible because humans are only capable of having imperfect subjective perspectives. Building off of this contention of ultimate subjectivity, Zhuangzi makes another skeptical argument on the basis of “universal variability,” with universal variability being the notion that since everyone perceives things differently, “There is no way to decide which perceptions ought to be trusted,” (Zhuangzi 322) which again provides us with the implication that objective knowledge is impossible.
