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澳洲悉尼代写作业:运气问题

Gettier问题从根本上证明了三元理论中的运气问题,从而证明了正确的信念并不一定意味着知识。我将通过以下gettier风格的例子来展示这一点:Susie每天下午2点在去上课的路上都会经过同一个时钟。今天,当她走过的时候,时钟确实是下午2点,她没有理由相信,因为时钟保养得很好,而且在过去一直是正确的。苏茜证明了她的真实信念是正确的。然而,苏西不知道的是,时钟在12个小时前的凌晨2点停止了。所以苏茜认为时钟显示的是下午2点,其实是凌晨2点。因此,时钟在它停的时间停止纯粹是运气使然。所以苏西的信念不是知识。如果知识是通过因果关系获得的,那么运气问题基本上就不存在了,因为主体是通过可靠的认知过程获得知识的。因果理论的目的是加强三部理论,但增加了一个条款,说明信念和真理之间的因果链是知识所必需的。高盛认为,感知就是这样一种机制,它允许因果关系,从而证明一个人的真实信念是正确的。他在1967年的论文《认识的因果理论》中指出;“也许将某一事实p与某人对p的信念联系起来的因果链最简单的例子就是知觉”(Goldman 358)。Goldman用花瓶的例子来加强他关于知觉的论点,他的论点是:S看到了一个花瓶,但是这个花瓶实际上是被花瓶的激光照片所隐藏的。因为这张照片,S认为他前面有一个花瓶。高盛认为,事实上,S并没有真正看到花瓶,因为S的信念和真正的花瓶之间缺乏因果联系。最终,高盛想说的是通过视觉获得的知识需要某种因果关系才能成为真正的知识。因此,根据高盛的说法,Gettier问题基本上得到了解决,因为它增加了因果关系条款。

澳洲悉尼代写作业:运气问题

The Gettier problem fundamentally demonstrates the problem of luck in the Tripartite Theory and thus shows how justified true belief doesn’t necessarily mean knowledge. I will present this through the following Gettier-style example: Susie walks past the same clock everyday on her way to class at 2pm. Today, as she walks past, the clock indeed says 2pm and she has no reason to believe otherwise since the clock is well maintained and has always been right in the past. Susie has justified true belief. However, unbeknownst to Susie, the clock stopped 12 hours earlier at 2am. So whilst Susie believes the clock reads 2pm, it actually reads 2am. Thus, the fact that the clock stopped at the time it did is purely down to luck. So Susie’s belief fails to be knowledge. If knowledge were to be gained via a causal connection, the problem of luck would essentially not exist as the agent would have acquired knowledge through a reliable, cognitive process. The purpose of the causal theory is to reinforce the Tripartite Theory but with the addition of a clause that states that a causal chain between beliefs and truths is required for knowledge. Goldman argues that perception is one such mechanism that can allow a causal connection and thus justify one’s true beliefs. He states in his 1967 paper “A Causal Theory of Knowing”; “Perhaps the simplest case of a causal chain connecting some fact p with someone’s belief of p is that of perception” (Goldman 358). Goldman uses the example of the vase to reinforce his argument about perception which is put forth as follows: S sees a vase but that vase is actually being hidden by a laser photograph of a vase. Because of the photograph, S believes that there is a vase in front of him. Goldman argues that in actual fact, S does not really see the vase because of the lack of causal connection that exists between S’s belief and the real vase. So ultimately, what Goldman is saying is that knowledge acquired by sight requires some sort of causal connection for it to truly be knowledge. And so the Gettier problem is essentially resolved, according to Goldman, with the addition of the causal connection clause.