本报告的目的是审查的一个经典的实验作品由Andreoni和米勒是书面的，命名为给根据GARP为利他偏好的一致性测试。本文在修正后的独裁者博弈结果的基础上，研究了利他行为的一致性和合理性，并得出最重要的结论，即利他主义是一致的偏好，并可以被捕获在标准的经济模型
在第1节中，我回顾了本文的主要内容，包括实验设计，检查的合理性，估计偏好，预测，嫉妒偏好。2节提出了一些影响和外部实验室的应用程序，来自作者和我的个人想法的实验结果。3节将讨论在微观经济和实验侧的模型的弱点，并说明如何解决这些问题。第4节是最后的结论。
总之，在我看来，A和M的论文可以放在两个观点的一个重要位置。首先，他们的实验是最简单和最有影响力的概括的独裁者游戏，是利用在大量的其他作品。其次，结果提供了一个强有力的论点，经典的理论可以完全解释的实验室代理的利他行为。随后，CES效用函数提供了一个很好的估计的数据收集。最后，作者得出结论，个体偏好异质性，范围从完全自私，罗尔斯和功利的，他们应该在个体水平研究。
除了上述的贡献外，我认为在他们的作品中仍然存在许多值得商榷的问题。其中的一些，例如，涉及到实验设计，已经解决了其他作品，而其他人，特别是这是理论框架，仍然是开放的。本文的一个隐含的假设是线性和光滑的预算约束，但是，例如，如果收入也取决于价格，非线性预算应考虑。或更一般的问题是，在许多假设，包括社会偏好，如不平等厌恶、利他；相互依存的偏好，基于互惠和公理化方法的意图，从而为经济现象提供了最好的诠释，这是最好的对收集到的数据？
麦考瑞大学代写ASSIGNMENT:根据GARP
The purpose of this report is to review one of the classical experimental works written by Andreoni and Miller AM, named as Giving according to GARP: an experimental test of the consistency of preferences for Altruism. In this paper, basing on modified dictator game outcomes the authors research the consistency and rationality of altruistic behavior and comes up with the most important conclusion that altruism is consistent preference and can be captured in standard economic models
In the section 1, I review the main content of the paper, including experimental design, checking rationality, estimating preferences, prediction, jealous preferences. Section 2 suggests some implications and outside-laboratory applications derived from the experiment outcomes both by the authors and my personal ideas. Section 3 will discuss on weakness of the models both on microeconomic side and experimental side and illustrate how to solve these problems. Section 4 is a final conclusion.
In conclusion, in my perspective, A&M's paper could be placed an important position for two points of views. Firstly, their experiments are the simplest and most influential generalization of dictator game that is exploited in a great deal of other works. Secondly, the outcomes provide a strong argument that classical theory can totally account well for altruistic behaviors of laboratory agents. Following that, the CES utility function provides a good estimation for the collected data. Thirdly, the authors conclude that individual preferences are heterogeneous, ranging from perfectly selfish, Rawlsian and utilitarian and they should be investigated at individual level.
Besides the contribution above, I argue that there remain many questionable problems in their works. Some of them, e.g., which relate to experimental design, have been solved by other works whereas, others, particularly which are theoretical frameworks, are still open. An implicit assumption in this paper is linear and smooth budget constraint; however, for example, if income also depends on price, the non-linear budget should be taken into consideration. Or a more general question is that among many hypothesis, including social preferences, such as inequality aversion, altruism; interdependent preferences, intention based reciprocity and axiomatic approach, which can provide the best interpretation for economic phenomena, which work best on the collected data?
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